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Abstract: 
The underpricing phenomenon has been well recognized in all the stock markets in the world. This study aims first 
to analyze the existence of underpricing issue of Moroccan IPOs, and then to measure this performance on a sample 
of 13 funded firms listed in Casablanca stock market from 2000 to 2018. The results show that the performance 
increases from 18,1% the 1st day to reach 37% the 30th day 
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1. Introduction   
Given the diversity of players, IPO operations are often carried out in a context of informational asymmetry which 
has direct consequences on the pricing of listed assets which often observe a discount or an underpricing. Often 
explained by an ex ante information differential between stakeholders on the real value of the assets issued, or as 
a signal from the issuers. 
Overall, the review of the degree of underpricing analysis determines the existence of positive initial returns 
in all stock markets. The level of underpricing varies from country to country and depending on whether the market 
is developing or developed. 
Likewise, the literature has also focused on the impact of investors on this performance of IPOs and their 
certifying effect by studying their role in the reduction of the level of informational asymmetry, and the reduction 
of conflicts agency and therefore in improving the performance of the IPO. 
In this paper, we are interested in the short-term performance of IPOs of companies financed by private equity 
investors by measuring its evolution during the first 30 days after listing on a sample of 13 funded firms listed in 
the Moroccan market between 2000 and 2018. 
The document will be organized as follows. first, we present a non-exhaustive literature relating to the study 
of the short-term stock market performance of companies listed on the stock exchange. then we describe the 
methodology adopted and the sample before closing with the results 
 
2. Literature Review 
One of the most widely studied phenomena in the finance literature is the return of the IPO (Initial Public Offerings) 
starting price, and it is in this context that a large number of Theoretical and empirical researches has been carried 
out in order to understand this phenomenon of underpricing. Thus, the first significant contributions in the 
performance of IPOs measured  by underpricing were made by: 
Reilly and Hatfield (1969), whose study involved a sample of 53 IPOs between December 1963 and June 
1965, and where they found a positive abnormal return of 9.9% on the first week of trading, 
Stoll and Curley (1970), who analyzed the case of a sample of 643 small firms entered on the stock market 
in 1957, 1959 and 1963 as part of a special regulation (designed specifically for companies whose amount of issue 
was less than $ 300,000, to enable them to present simplified financial information), the results achieved being a 
42.4% return 
McDonald and Fisher (1972)  who studied the stock market behavior of newly-traded securities from a sample 
of 142 US companies introduced in the first quarter of 1969, and the profitability of the sample averaged 28.5% 
for the first week, 34.6% for the second week, and -3.2% for the third week. 
Logue (1973), which considers that none of these two previous studies presented a rigorous attempt to explain 
this undervaluation according to the attributes of the program itself, contemporary market conditions, or the 
qualities of the parties. relevant models, ie the issuing company, the subscriber (or introducing banker), and the 
potential investor, whether estimates from a sample of 250 new IPOs including 2 sub-samples of programs made 
by "prestigious" and "non-prestigious" subscribers but that in all 250 issues, prices were set after negotiation of 
the parties concerned , and concludes that any explanation of the performance of new emissions must incorporate 
the implications of the monopsony model into its structure. 
McDonald and Jacquillat (1974) when they study a sample of 31 IPOs carried out in France between 1968 
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and 1971, and note an average undervaluation of 3% on the first day, 4.8% the first week and 5 % the first month. 
However, Ibbotson (1975)  is the first to provide an explanation for the phenomenon of underpricing by 
saying that issuers would like to "leave a good taste in investors 'mouths" ("leave a good taste in investors' mouth"). 
Anglo-Saxon expression) so that the next subscriptions solicited by these same issuers can be realized at a 
favorable price, in his study considered pioneering, on a sample of 128 IPOs carried out during the period 1960-
1969 in the US, and in which he highlighted an initial profitability of 11.4%, 
Leland and Pyle (1977)  propose in a theoretical model analyzing the fraction of shares held by the 
entrepreneur as a favorable signal of the growth opportunities of the company thus conveying information to future 
investors on the quality of the company. , and thereby positively influencing the value of the security, resulting in 
a correct valuation of the value of the company 
Jacquillat et al. (1978)  affirm the existence of a positive average of abnormal returns after IPOs by measuring 
an undervaluation of 15% over the first six months of trading of a sample of 60 IPOs on the French market between 
1966 and 1974. 
Baron (1982) proposes, in his model, that the subscriber is more informed about the new issue market than 
the issuing company, as a result, and under the assumption that the issuing company is unable to control or measure 
the efforts provided. by the subscriber in the transaction, the latter is encouraged to undervalue in order to minimize 
its risk of selling the entire amount involved in the transaction, to potential investors 
Titman and Trueman (1986) find a negative relationship between the presence of reputable auditors and the 
degree of undervaluation Carter and Manaster (1990)  explain the underpricing by the presence of uninformed 
investors whose subscription is necessary for the success of the introduction operation. 
 Taking as basis the work of Leland and Pyle (1977), Titman and Trueman (1986), Carter and Manaster (1990)  
several authors such as Barry et al. (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991), and Brav and Gompers (1997) manage 
to show a link between the presence of Capital Investors during the IPO and the level of underpricing by indicating 
that the degree of valuation depends on whether an IPO is backed by venture capital or not, and specifically show 
that backed IPOs are more severely underpriced than backed IPOs.  
Thus, Barry et al. (1990) examining a comprehensive set of 433 IPOs of venture-backed companies and 1123 
IPOs non-backed over the period 1978 to 1987 examine whether financial markets recognize the oversight and 
control provided by venture capitalists, and find that IPOs with higher quality VCs are less undervalued, leading 
them, by taking the empirical evidence as a whole, to assert that venture capitalists play an important role in 
governance and recovery newly created companies. 
Similarly, Megginson and Weiss (1991) taking a sample of 320 venture-backed companies and 320 other 
non-backed firms operating in the same sectors and as close to each other in terms of size, floated on the stock 
market between January 1983 and September 1987, show that the IPOs of the companies supported score relatively 
poorly on the first day, which they attribute to venture capital certification which reduces the informational 
asymmetry between investors and investees 
Jain and Kini (1995), based on the results of their previous study involving 682 listed IPOs between 1976 and 
1988, (Jain and Kini (1994)), measure the operational performance of 136 IPOs supported and 136 non-capital-
supported IPOs. risk, and find better post-IPO operational performance. 
 Lin (1996), for its part, shows the role of shareholder certification in the IPO process, taking as an example 
a sample of 497 venture-backed IPOs and 2137 non-backed IPOs, and thus confirms the recognition by the market 
for the presence of venture capital in an issuing company through a reduction of underpricing of its assets during 
the IPO.  
Brav and Gompers (1997), using a sample of 934 IPOs of US venture-backed firms during the period 1972-
1992, and 3407 IPOs of non-backed firms during the period 1975-1992, find that they surpass the IPOs of non-
backed companies. This superior performance of the backed firms IPOs is often attributed to the establishment of 
management teams and better corporate governance structures that help these firms to achieve better long-term 
success. 
Lin and Smith (1998) also looked at the performance of CI-sponsored IPOs by taking a sample of 2,634 US 
firms between 1979 and 1990 and found that venture-backed IPOs, and especially those that used better 
Subscribers with good reputations achieve a lower undervaluation because of this dual reputation: that of the 
venture capital company and that of the subscriber.  
Hamao, Packer and Ritter (2000), using a sample of 355 IPOs of venture-backed Japanese firms between 
1989 and 1994, find no evidence of long-term outperformance of venture-backed firm IPOs, except for companies 
backed by foreign venture capital firms or independent venture capitalists.  
Hogan, Olson and Kish (2001) analyzing the first-day performance of LBOs and comparing them to original 
IPOs, show that if the original IPO had an original return of 13%, LBO had an average yield surplus of 7.64%, 
thus confirming the theory of informational asymmetry that undervaluation is significantly reduced when firms 
are supported by LBO. 
Ray da Silva Rosa, Gerard Velayuthen, Terry Walter (2003) On a sample of 333 IPOs of industrial firms 
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identified in Australia between 1991 and 1999 and 38 of which are backed by venture capital, find no statistically 
significant difference between IPOs and venture-backed  
Lee and Wahal (2004) examine a sample of 6413 IPOs between 1980 and 2000, of which 2383 are venture-
backed and show that the supported IPOs outperform the non backed IPOs by finding a trend. up over the entire 
period with a yield spread of between 5.0% and 10.3% over the period 1988-1998 and a much larger gap during 
the 1999-2000 internet bubble.  
Hadryd, Mietzner and Shciereck (2010) have more closely studied under-valuation and long-term 
performance and have justified that they reflect the degree of information asymmetry between issuer and investor. 
Under the assumption that the level of undervaluation is a negative function of the reputation of the pimp, they try 
to distinguish between private equity and venture capital by the supported firms, which are smaller and high growth 
in the case risk capital, and have greater maturity in the case of private equity, to analyze whether a difference in 
undervaluation or long-term performance is observable, the study predicts that private equity firms low returns 
and low underpricing, and confirms that the level of underpricing is higher in the case of venture-backed companies 
than in private equity-backed ones.  
Krishnan, Masulis, Ivanov, and Singh (2011) provide further support to Brav and Gompers (1997) 's point of 
view by confirming that better-performing venture capital firms invest in holding companies with better long-term 
performance. post-IPO term. 
Levis (2011) studies a sample of 1,595 IPOs including those supported by venture capital and private equity 
during the period January 1992 to September 2005 at the London Stock Exchange, examining operational 
performance, and the result is that the companies supported decline a better performance than unsupported ones. 
Ritter (2011) also demonstrates, in a study covering the period 1980-2006, an average adjusted return of -
12.9% for IPOS supported by venture capital and an equivalent return of 7.1% for their counterparties in Private 
equity LBOs. 
Chemmanur, Simonyan, Tehranian (2012) asserted that the quality of the venture capital management team 
plays a certification role in transmitting a company's intrinsic value to the market, thereby reducing information 
asymmetry. They assume that companies supported by private equity / venture capital are associated with a higher 
quality of management compared to companies not supported by private equity / risk capital. 
Finally, although this review is not exhaustive, all of the authors quoted, and many others, have tested, in one 
way or another, the impact of private equity on company performance. By bringing together, then, the various 
studies concerning performance during and post-IPOs and especially those establishing the link between the active 
involvement of Capital Investors in the financed companies and its link with undervaluation, it appears ultimately 
in the literature that the presence of CIs at the time of IPO can have a positive impact on the level of undervaluation 
and in some cases on post-IP0 performance in the medium and long term. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Sample and data: 
The constitution of our sample is established on the basis of newly listed companies. 
Among the 75 IPOs between the year 2000 and the year 2018, we eliminated, first of all, companies belonging 
to the financial sector (banks, insurance companies and finance companies, etc.), due to the fact that they are 
subject to precise regulations on accounting and prudential ratios. 
Then, we selected the companies whose information on the identity and shareholding of shareholders in their 
capital before and after IPO is complete, and on the matching criteria that we have chosen. 
In total, we obtained 26 companies, 13 of which are financed by Private Equity which constitute our basic 
sample, the 13 others form the control companies. 
A matching methodology was used based on a three-fold criterion of market capitalization, company size and 
industry. 
We then matched each of the 13 funded firms with the one that has the same criteria (within a range of + or - 
30% for capitalization). 
 
3.2.  The dependent variable: Short-term performance (initial underpricing)  
Regarding the valuation state, for each IPO, researchers generally use the classic method which estimates the initial 
return to equilibrium according to two measures for underpricing, either with or without market adjustment: 
- The underpricing, denoted RI i, t, which presents the unadjusted initial return, is calculated according to 








- RI i, t: is the initial profitability for company "i" on day t after IPO; 
- Pi, 0: represents the subscription price for company “i”; 
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- Pi, t: is the closing price on the tth trading day (t = 1, 5, 10, 20 and 30 trading days) after 
company “i” has been listed on the stock market. 
The sign of the relative spread between the equilibrium price and the offer price provides information on 
the valuation status of IPOs of the securities. The security is said to be undervalued if the difference is 
positive (RI> 1) and overvalued by the market otherwise. (RI <1) 
- And the adjusted undervaluation, denoted RIA i, t, which presents the initial return adjusted to the 
movement of the market. To adjust these returns, we use the "MASI" index (Moroccan All Shares Index) 
which is a composition of all the securities listed on this market. 
The initial underpricing in this case is measured by the initial profitability of the security "i" on day t adjusted 









- RIA i, t: is the initial profitability adjusted by the market return for company “i”, on day t 
after IPO. 
- Pi, 0: represents the subscription price for company "i", 
- Pi, t: is the closing price on the tth trading day (t = 1, 5, 10, 20 and 30 trading days) after the 
IPO of company "i", 
- Mt: is the closing value of the market  index on day t after introduction of security "i", 
- M0: represents the level of the market index the day before the listing of this same security 
on the stock market. 
 
4. Empirical Results: descriptive statistics of abnormal initial returns. 
To analyze the abnormal initial returns of companies financed by private equity introduced over a period of 30 
days after listing, we first use the method of calculating returns in discrete time. Then, we adjust the initial yield 
of the security by the corresponding yield of the Moroccan All Shares Index (MASI) taking into account the market 
fluctuations between the day the offer price is set and the first day of listing. 
In the tables below, we present the parametric and non-parametric tests of the abnormal initial profitability 
of private equity-financed companies. 





5th  Day 
IR 
10th  Day 
IR 
20th  Day 
IR 
30th   Day 
Average  13 0,171*** 0,396*** 0,426*** 0,373*** 0,409*** 
Student test  13 3,797 4,007 3,344 3,127 3,060 
Médian 13 0,116*** 0,455*** 0,391** 0,404** 0,437** 
Wilcoxon rank test 13 2,832 2,589 2,481 2,411 2,341 
***significant at de 1% level; **significant at de 5% level; *significant at de 10% level 
 





5th  Day 
AIR 
10th  Day 
AIR 
20th  Day 
AIR 
30th  Day 
Average  13 0,181*** 0,399*** 0,430*** 0,348*** 0,370*** 
Student test 13 3,689 4,148 3,567 3,074 3,009 
Médian 13 0,110*** 0,504*** 0,399*** 0,375** 0,396** 
Wilcoxon rank test 13 2,830 2,551 2,551 2,341 2,341 
***significant at de 1% level ; **significant at de 5% level; *significant at de 10% level 
The descriptive statistics of initial abnormal return reveal that the firms studied have an average underpricing 
on the first day of listing, of 17.1%. Taking into account market fluctuations, the underpricing reaches almost the 
same percentage with an average of 18.1%. The two calculated means of underpricing are statistically significant 
at the 1% level. 
On the other hand, if we continue to examine abnormal return over a longer period of time, the IPO price 
offers a larger initial discount from the post-IPO prices. 
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Indeed, by using the closing price of the 5th day of quotation, the initial profitability is 39.6% (that adjusted 
to market returns is 39.9%). It increases continuously over the other trading days to reach 40.9% on the 30th 
trading day (profitability adjusted to market returns is 37%), the results of the Student test from the 1st trading day 
until 30th day are all significant at the 1% level. 
According to the Wilcoxon test on a single sample, the results show an abnormal initial return on the first day 
of trading of 11.6%, significant at the 1% level (that adjusted to market returns is 11% significant at the 1% level ). 
It increases continuously until the 5th day to reach a median profitability of 45.5%, significant at the 1% level 
(that adjusted to market returns is 50.4%, significant at the 1% level). If we continue to analyze the median 
abnormal profitability over a longer period, we find that profitability recovers to 43.7% on the 30th day of trading 
(that adjusted to market returns is 39.6% significant at the 5 %). 
Figure 1: Evolution of Initial Returns. 
 
 




The present study aimed to analyze the IPO short-term performance within the context of the Casablanca Stock 
Exchange (CSE). This performance is measured first by the initial returns in the first 30th  trading days, then by 
initial returns adjusted to the Moroccan All Shared Indexes (MASI). 
The results prove that underpricing increase from 17,1% on the 1st day to 40.9% on the 30th trading day, for 
initial returns (IR) and  from 18,1% to 37% for adjusted initial returns (AIR). 
To follow up on this research, it would be interesting to try to clarify in a subsequent research the different 
explanations given by the literature to this evolution of returns, and especially the impact of the involvement of 
capital investors in governance on short, medium and long term performance. 
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